Observations on Capital Market Regulation: Hong Kong and the People\u27s Republic of China by Shinkle, John T.
OBSERVATIONS ON CAPITAL MARKET
REGULATION: HONG KONG AND THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA
JOHN T. SHINKLE*
1. INTRODUCTION: THE HAND-OVER
For more than 150 years, Hong Kong has been controlled by
the British government, and in recent years has become a center
of both trade and finance. Hong Kong's economic system has
been an expression of market principles. Individuals and enter-
prises have been able to buy, sell, and invest to a large degree
without governmental controls and restraints. Many believe that
this market approach has been an important source of the
economic energy that has characterized Hong Kong in the last
half of the twentieth century.'
At midnight on June 30, 1997, the control of Hong Kong will
pass from the United Kingdom to the People's Republic of China
("P.R.C."), pursuant to the joint declaration by the two govern-
" Managing Director, Asia Pacific Legal/Compliance, Salomon Brothers
Hong Kong. B.A. Yale 1967; J.D. Harvard 1970. Court Law Clerk, U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 1970-71; Caplin &
Drystale, Washington D.C., Associate, 1971-77, Partner 1977-80; Securities and
Exchange Commission, Washington, D.C., Associate Director, Division of
Corporation Finance, 1980-81, Deputy General Counsel, 1981-82; Salomon
Brothers Inc., General Counsel/Vice President 1982-87, Director 1988-95.
The author received assistance on this Article from various sources, notably
Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, Clifford Chance, Freshfields, Johnson
Stokes & Master and Kwok & Yih and several colleagues at Salomon Brothers.
Larry Kwok's recently published analysis and compilation of Hong Kong
securities laws was a valuable guide. LARRY L.K. KWOK & PETER F. AMOUR,
CORPORATE SECuRTIES LAW (1996) (published in three volumes). Michael
Hickman of Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton advised extensively on China
issues, and his colleagues Zhang Jun and Elise Harte provided research
assistance, as did Tammie Tam of Johnson Stokes & Master. All help is greatly
appreciated, but responsibility for the content of this Article, of course, rests
solely with the autlior.
1 See BRUCE BUENO DE MESQUITA ET AL., RED FLAG OVER HONG KONG
11, 19-21 (1996) (cussing the beneficial effects of limited government and a
free market on the Hong Kong economy).
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
ments in 1984 ("Joint Declaration").2 While the provisions of the
Joint Declaration are designed to assure the maintenance of Hong
Kong's social, legal and economic system for fifty years after the
hand-over, the new Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
("S.A.R.") will be part of and under the authority of the P.R.C.,
and governed under the new basic law for the S.A.R. ("Basic
Law") .3
In contrast to Hong Kong, the P.R.C. has been following
economic policies involving a high degree of government
ownership and control. In the last few years, purely government-
controlled, "command" economies - most notably, the Soviet
Union - have encountered difficulties or essentially failed. The
P.R.C., although it has had some economic problems, has
continued its past policies, and at the same time experimented
significantly with market processes. This modified program has
brought substantial economic progress in the P.R.C.
4
Hong Kong is already part of the P.R.C.'s market experimen-
tation. Much of the trade and finance now flowing through Hong
Kong is in some way related to the P.R.C.' Accordingly, there is
reason to believe that the P.R.C. will continue to support Hong
Kong's market approach. Nevertheless, the role of the P.R.C.
government in the economy remains very substantial, and the
interrelationship of Hong Kong and the P.R.C. assures interaction
between their policies. Indeed, since the hand-over was agreed
upon in 1984, government bodies and businesses in Hong Kong
have sought to function in harmony with the P.R.C. With the
hand-over becoming a reality, the influence of the P.R.C. in Hong
Kong's economic affairs will only grow.
' Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong, Dec. 19, 1984, U.K.-
P.R.C., 1985 Fr. Brit. T.S. No. 26 (Cmnd. 9543).
' Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianggang Tebie Xingzheng Qu Jiben Fa
[The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the
People's Republic of China], Apr. 4, 1990, ZHONGHUA RENMIN
GONGHEGUO FALO FAGUI (Huoye) 1-4-0-I1 [hereinafter FALO FAGUI],
translated in [1990 - 1994 Special Zones and Cities] China Laws for Foreign Bus.
(CCH) 100-010 [hereinafter Basic Law].
4 See £enerally DE MESQUITA ET AL., supra note 1, at 36-39 (discussing the
history of centralized economic control in the P.R.C. and detailing significant
economic improvements in the P.R.C.); FRANK CHING, HONG KONG &
CHINA 62 (1985) (describing the mixed system of state-owned enterprises and
decentralization).
s See discussion infra Section 10.
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Capital markets are of continuing importance to both Hong
Kong and the P.R.C. Economic growth depends upon capital to
create the facilities for production and delivery of goods and
services. In the P.R.C., the government itself is historically the
primary source of capital, but investment funds increasingly come
from non-governmental sources. In Hong Kong, non-governmen-
tal market sources have provided most of the capital for some
time.
In the early high-risk phases of economic development,
individual or corporate enterprises tend to obtain capital mainly
from internally generated funds and from banks or other financial
intermediaries. Ultimately, with expanding demand for capital
and the accumulation of savings by individuals and enterprises,
funds must be raised directly from the investors controlling these
savings. Capital markets perform this key function of raising
investment funds.
In addition to raising funds, capital markets allocate funds
among enterprises. Investors - the providers of capital - select
investments expected to generate the highest levels of profitability
consistent with the risks they are willing to assume. If investors
perceive a particular enterprise or market more favorably than
another, demand for that investment rises. Absent governmental
restrictions, capital follows investors' perceptions of relative risk
and return.
Capital markets can be national assets. A market may be
utilized by, and create revenues from, both domestic and interna-
tional capital providers and users. Markets themselves create value
for the community, and Hong Kong has already reaped such
benefits. However, the role and effectiveness of capital markets
depend on how they are managed and controlled.
This Article examines certain aspects of the regulation of
capital markets in Hong Kong and the P.R.C., in the hope of
understanding how they may evolve after the hand-over of Hong
Kong to the P.R.C. in mid-1997. It focuses on regulation of
capital raising processes, with limited reference to private
investment and lending, secondary trading of previously-issued
securities or derivatives, or financial institutions and market
participants as such (and does not address other economic, social
or political issues). The subjects covered by such a review are
inevitably arbitrary, and these observations are too abbreviated to
support predictions, but it may be possible to discern lines of
19971
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future development.
2. REGULATORY STRUCTURE
The regulation of capital markets in Hong Kong is under the
direction of a single agency separate from governmental organs of
economic and fiscal policy. This relatively simple structure is
quite different from regulation in the P.R.C., where capital
market processes are affected by actions of multiple governmental
bodies having various functions in the economy.
The Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission ("SFC")
is a government regulatory agency with general powers over the
securities markets, as well as futures and so-called leveraged foreign
exchange markets, including the two exchanges in Hong Kong.
The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited ("SEHK"), has a
statutory monopoly on stock exchange trading in Hong Kong.6
Similarly, the Hong Kong Futures Exchange, ("HKFE") is the
only licensed futures exchange in Hong Kong.7
The Hong Kong structure reflects the replacement of several
securities and futures market regulators by the SFC, largely in
response to regulatory weaknesses revealed in the 1987 market
break. At that time, among other things, stock and stock index
futures trading on the exchanges had to be suspended for several
6 See Securities Ordinance % 20-22, ch. 333 of the Laws of Hong Kong,
originally 12 of 1974 - L.N. 56 of 1974, L.N. 140 of 1974, 62 of 1976, 8 of 1978,
L.N. 92 of 1980, L.N. 101 of 1980, 47 of 1981, L.N. 377 of 1981, 58 of 1985,
R.Ed. 1986, 33 of 1988, 46 of 1988, L.N. 57 of 1988, L.N. 294 of 1988, 10 of
1989, L.N. 259 of 1989, R.Ed. 1989, 62 of 1990, 63 of 1990, 6 of 1991, 24 of
1991, 26 of 1992, 68 of 1992, 27 of 1993, 8 of 1994, 49 of 1995, 62 of 1995, 63
of 1995, 76 of 1996 [hereinafter SO]; Stock Exchanges Unification Ordinance
% 3, 27, ch. 361 of the Laws of Hong Kong, originally 55 of 1980 - L.N. 259
of 1980, 9 of 1982, 65 of 1982, 59 of 1985, L.N. 61 of 1986, 27 of 1986, R.Ed.
1986, 10 of 1989, R.Ed. 1989, 3 of 1990, 65 of 1990, 104 of 1991, 68 of 1992, 74
of 1994, 49 of 1995 [hereinafter SEUO].
7 See Commodities Trading Ordinance S 13, ch. 250 of the Laws of Hong
Kong, originally 59 of 1976 - 79 of 1976, L.N. 268 of 1979, L.N. 65 of 1980, 54
of 1980, 9 of 1982, 35 of 1982, 61 of 1985, L.N. 313 of 1985, R.Ed. 1985, L.N.
111 of 1986, 27 of 1986, 40 of 1987, L.N. 387 of 1987, 10 of 1989, L.N. 259 of
1989, R.Ed. 1989, L.N. 415 of 1989, 3 of 1990, 62 of 1990, 63 of 1990, 64 of
1990, 9 of 1991, L.N. 253 of 1991, 25 of 1992, L.N. 399 of 1992, 27 of 1993, 7
of 1994, L.N. 564 of 1994, 49 of 1995, 62 of 1995, 76 of 1996 [hereinafter
CTO]; Commodity Exchanges (Prohibition) Ordinance, ch. 82 of the Laws of
Hong Kong, originally 54 of 1973 -L.N. 163 of 1973, 59 of 1976, L.N. 269 of
1979, R.Ed. 1980, 10 of 1986, 8 of 1991, L.N. (C) 14 of 1996 (Chinese authentic
version).
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days and was resumed only with a financial back-stop provided by
Hong Kong banks to the HKFE.8 Following this crisis, there was
a study, resulting in May 1988 in a report9 the recommendations
of which were implemented principally through 1989 legislation
establishing the SFC.10
The SFC is a separate corporate body, distinct from the
executive branch of government; the SFC's ten directors, who are
appointed and serve at the pleasure of the Governor of Hong
Kong, include the SFC Chairman (currently Anthony Neoh, a
distinguished lawyer in Hong Kong) and its four operating
division heads, plus five persons who are not executives of the
SFC.1" After the hand-over, the Chief Executive of the S.A.R.
will make determinations regarding the directors of the SFC,
possibly after consultations with P.R.C. officials."
The two exchanges are limited liability companies governed by
their members which are their shareholders. 3 However, the
exchanges exercise self-regulatory responsibilities under the
supervision of the SFC.
1 4
The Hong Kong Monetary Authority ("HKMA") also has an
impact on capital markets. It administers Hong Kong government
debt issues in the capital markets and supervises banks in Hong
Kong. The HKMA's exercise of banking powers affects the
availability of credit and liquidity in capital markets, and so-called
exempt dealers subject to only limited regulation by the SFC
consist mainly of banks or other depository institutions under the
supervision of the KMA."15
See KEVIN RAFFERTY, CITY ON THE ROCKS 239-40 (1989).
9 See SECURITMES REVIEW COMMITTEE OF HONG KONG, THE OPERATION
AND REGULATION OF THE HONG KONG SECURiTIES INDUSTRY (1988) (some-
times referred to as the "Hay Davison Report" after Committee Chairman Ian
Hay Davison).
1H See Securities and Futures Commission Ordinance, ch. 24 of the Laws of
Hong Kong, originally 10 of 1989 - L.N. 259 of 1989, R.Ed. 1989, 62 of 1990,
63 of 1990, 66 of 1990, 67 of 1991, 77 of 1991, 24 of 1992, 68 of 1992, 82 of
1992, 87 of 1992, L.N. 96 of 1993, 53 of 1994, 73 of 1994, 7 of 1995, 49 of 1995,
62 of 1995, 68 of 1995, 9 of 1996, 66 of 1996, 76 of 1996 [hereinafter SFCO].
11 See id. % 3, 5.
12 See Basic Law, supra note 3, art. 48, para. (7).
13 See SEUO, supra note 6, § 3-4; CTO, supra note 7, § 13.
1 See SFCO, supra note 10, § 4(1) (d), (0, (k), 47-51; SO, supra note 6,
§ 23-29; SEUO, supra note 6, § 10A, 15, 34-37; CTO, supra note 7, % 13-25.
IS See generally SO, supra note 6, § 60; SFCO, supra note 10, § 4; Banking
Ordinance, ch. 155 of the Laws of Hong Kong, originally 27 of 1986 - L.N. 246
1997]
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Regulation of capital markets in the P.R.C. ultimately derives
from the National People's Congress ("NPC"), whose members
serve for five year periods; the NPC meets annually in full session
and more often by its Standing Committee.1 6 The NPC appoints
the State Council, the principal executive organ of the govern-
ment, consisting only of ministerial-level government leaders,
including Premier Li Peng and Vice Premier Zhu Rongii." The
Communist Party of China also has great power in the P.R.C.;
senior government officials often have positions in the party.
In late 1992, the State Council took action"h to authorize the
State Council Securities Commission ("SCSC"), currently chaired
by P.R.C. Vice Premier Zhu Rongii, to set policy for securities
markets, and also the China Securities Regulatory Commission
("CSRC"), currently headed by Zhou Daojiong, to carry out these
policies. The SCSC consists of fourteen members appointed by
the State Council from interested government departments
of 1986, L.N. 258 of 1986, L.N. 274 of 1986, L.N. 21 of 1987, L.N. 276 of 1987,
64 of 1987, L.N. 373 of 1987, L.N. 412 of 1987, L.N. 413 of 1987, R.Ed. 1987,
26 of 1988, 68 of 1988, L.N. 106 of 1988, L.N. 255 of 1988, L.N. 272 of 1988,
L.N. 285 of 1988, L.N. 300 of 1988, L.N. 346 of 1988, L.N. 5 of 1989, L.N. 66
of 1989, L.N. 75 of 1989, 10 of 1989, 14 of 1989, L.N. 283 of 1989, L.N. 333
of 1989, L.N. 397 of 1989, L.N. 412 of 1989, L.N. 413 of 1989, L.N. 30 of 1990,
3 of 1990, L.N. 79 of 1990, 29 of 1990, L.N. 210 of 1990, 43 of 1990, L.N. 63
of 1991, 41 of 1991, 95 of 1991, L.N. 407 of 1991, 67 of 1992, 68 of 1992, 82 of
1992, L.N. 82 of 1993, L.N. 96 of 1993, L.N. 146 of 1993, 77 of 1993, 94 of
1993, L.N. 120 of 1994, L.N. 449 of 1994, L.N. 450 of 1994, 49 of 1995, L.N.
307 of 1995, 62 of 1995, L.N. 70 of 1996, L.N. 336 of 1996, 4 of 1997; Exchange
Fund Ordinance, ch. 66 of the Laws of Hong Kong, originally 54 of 1935 (Cap.
66, 1950 Ed.) - 44 of 1936, 57 of 1936, 9 of 1937, 21 of 1939, 12 of 1946, 20 of
1948, 4 of 1951, 54 of 1956, 14 of 1958, 6 of 1964, 31 of 1968, 47 of 1968, 57
of 1970, 90 of 1970, 25 of 1971, L.N. 150 of 1971, L.N. 125 of 1972, 8 of 1975,
7 of 1978, 17 of 1979, L.N. 56 of 1980, L.N. 173 of 1980, L.N. 363 of 1980,
L.N. 388 of 1981, 26 of 1983, 16 of 1984, 76 of 1984, 27 of 1986, L.N. 64 of
1987, R.Ed. 1987, L.N. 333 of 1989, 82 of 1992, 58 of 1993, 81 of 1994, L.N.
(C) 40 of 1994 (Chinese authentic version), 12 of 1995, § 5A.
-6 See ZHONGHuA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XIANFA [The Constitution of
the People's Republic of China] ch. HI, arts. 57-61 (1982), translated in [1
Business Regulation] China Laws for Foreign Bus. (CCH) 4-500 (1982)
[hereinafter China Laws].
17 See id. arts. 62, 85-86.
1 See Guowuyuan Guanyu Jinyibu Jiaqiang Zhengjuan Hongguan Guanli
de Tongzhi [Notice from the State Council Regarding the Further Strengthen-
ing of the Overall Administration of the Securities Market], Dec. 17, 1992,
FALO FAGUI, supra note 3, 2-6-5-IV.4 [hereinafter Document 68], translated in
INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES INSTITUTE LIMITED, THE P.R.C. SECURITIES
MARKET HANDBOOK NSCR-1 (1994) [hereinafter ISI HANDBOOK].
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including the Ministry of Finance, the State Planning Commis-
sion, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation
and the State Commission for Restructuring the Economic
System; the CSRC Chairman also serves as Deputy Director of
SCSC.19
The Shanghai Stock Exchange ("SHSE") was established in
1990, and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange ("SZSE") in 1991; these
exchanges are supervised by the CSRC and, respectively, by the
Shanghai and Shenzhen Municipal Securities Administrative
Offices, which are agencies of the municipal governments.20
However, these local agencies also operate under the guidance of
the SCSC and CSRC, and in 1996, the State Council acted to
strengthen the role of the CSRC, giving it more effective control
in supervising the exchanges. 1
Several other organs of P.R.C. government under the State
Council are important to the capital markets.
The State Planning Commission ("SPC") has general authority
over economic planning.2
The State Commission on Restructuring the Economic System
("SCRES") has responsibility for conversion of government
enterprises into joint stock companies.23
The State-Owned Assets Administration Bureau ("SAAB") is
responsible for state-owned assets, and is a key actor in the
reorganization of Chinese companies preparing for an equity
offering.24
The State Administration of Industry and Commerce ("SAIC")
is responsible for administrative supervision of Chinese companies,
19 See W. William A. Woods & Susan M. Selwyn, The Securities Markets of
the People's Republic of China, ISI HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 1, 93-95.
20 The SHSE and SZSE were established prior to the creation of the SCSC
and CSRC pursuant to municipal government authorizations in the two cities.
See EUGENE MARANS & MICHAEL HICKMAN, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES
INSTITUTE, CUSTODIAL SERVICES IN ASIA, PRC 56, 58, 60 (1993).
21 See Document 68, supra note 18; Zhengjuan Jiaoyisuo Guanli Banfa
[Securities Exchange Administration Measures], Aug. 21, 1996, reprinted in
JINRONG RIBAO [FINANCIAL DAILY], Aug. 30, 1996; see also Stock Exchange
Administration Procedures, CHINA L. & PRAC., Sept. 1996, at 9-10.
' See Document 68, supra note 18.
23 See id.
24 See Guoyou Qiye Caichan Jiandu Guanli Tiaoli [Regulation on the
Supervision and Administration of the Assets of State-Owned Enterprises], July
24, 1994, FALO FAGuI, supra note 3, 2-2-0-11195.
1997]
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which among other things, includes the issuance of business
licenses and the maintenance of on-going business registration
records."
The People's Bank of China ("PBOC")26 licenses all financial
institutions including banks and securities firms, regulates financial
institutions and - together with the SPC and the State Adminis-
tration of Foreign Exchange - controls borrowings by P.R.C.
entities.'
The State Administration of Foreign Exchange ("SAFE")
supervises foreign exchange transactions including borrowings in
foreign currencies. 2
The Ministry of Finance ("MOF") is responsible for sovereign
borrowings by the P.R.C., including domestic and foreign bond
issues.29
3. LAws AND RULES
Neither Hong Kong nor the P.R.C. has a unified source of
laws and rules for the securities markets. However, with the
consolidation of regulatory powers under all the relevant statutes
in the SFC, the laws and rules in Hong Kong are reasonably well
integrated. In the P.R.C., while the CSRC has the most signifi-
cant role in the securities markets, other agencies have powers
which interact with those of the CSRC, sometimes in complex
ways.
The principal laws in Hong Kong pertinent to capital raising
2s See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Qiye Faren Dengji Guanli Tiaoli
[Regulations on the Registration o Enterprise Legal Persons], July 22, 1991,
FALY FAGUI, supra note 3, 4-21-0-Ell.5, translated-in [2 Business Regulation]
China Laws, supra note 16, 13-542.
26 See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhongguo Renmin Yinhang Fa [The
People's Bank of China Law], Mar. 18, 1995, translated in [1 Business
Regulation] China Laws, supra note 16, 8450.
2 See id.; Document 68, supra note 18; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo
Waihui Guanli Tiaoli [The People's Republic of China Foreign Exchange
Administration Regulations], Jan. 29, 1996, FALO FAGUI, supra note 3, 4-4-2-
111 16, translated in [1 Business Regulation] China Laws, supra note 16, 8-540.
21 See People's Republic of China Foreign Exchange Administration
Regulations, supra note 27.
29 See Guowuyuan Guanyu Jinyibu Jiaqiang Jieyong Guoji Shangye
Daikuan Hongguan Guanli de Tongzhi [State Council Notice on the Further
Strengthening of Overall Administration of International Commercial Loans],
Sept. 27, 1995, art. 2, FALO FAGUI, supra note 3, 4-4-1-IV914.
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are:
Securities Ordinance ("SO") - sets forth general provisions
for registration of securities industry participants, supervision of
exchanges and dealers and prevention of improper trading
practices; 0
Protection of Investors Ordinance ("PIO") - prohibits
public solicitations of securities transactions except by regulated
firms, pursuant to a qualified prospectus or in an exempted
transaction;
31
Securities (Disclosure of Interests) Ordinance ("SDIO") -
requires substantial shareholders, directors and chief executives of
Hong Kong listed companies to disclose interests in securities of
the company;
3 2
Securities (Insider Dealing) Ordinance ("SID 0") - prohibits
insider trading;33
Companies Ordinance ("CO") - prescribes prospectus
content and other requirements for company offerings of
securities by companies incorporated in and outside of Hong
Kong;34 and
3 SO, supra note 6.
31 Protection of Investors Ordinance, ch. 335 of the Laws of Hong Kong,
originally 13 of 1974, L.N. 38 of 1974, L.N. 56 of 1974, 9 of 1983, R.Ed. 1983,
10 of 1989, 44 of 1989, R.Ed. 1989, 7 of 1991, 82 of 1992, 77 of 1993, 94 of
1993, 54 of 1994 [hereinafter PIO].
32 Securities (isclosure of Interests) Ordinance, ch. 396 of the Laws of
Hong Kong, originally 63 of 1988 - R.Ed. 1988, 10 of 1989, 45 of 1990, 68 of
1991, 68 of 1992, 82 of 1992, 49 of 1995, 62 of 1995 [hereinafter SDIO].
" Securities (Insider Dealing) Ordinance, ch. 395 of the Laws of Hong
Kong, originallr 62 of 1990 - 69 of 1991, 68 of 1992, 29 of 1994, 61 of 1995, 62
of 1995, L.N. 391 of 1996 [hereinafter SIDO].
14 Companies Ordinance, ch. 32 of the Laws of Hong Kong, originally 39
of 1932 (Cap.32, 1950) - 29 of 1933, 24 of 1935, 15 of 1936, 20 of 1948, 1 of
1949, 9 of 1950, 22 of 1950, 24 of 1950, 23 of 1952, 15 of 1955, 25 of 1958, 4
of 1963, 30 of 1964, 22 of 1965, L.N. 100 of 1968, L.N. 151 of 1969, 21 of 1970,
24 of 1970, 41 of 1970, 49 of 1970, L.N. 72 of 1971, 27 of 1971, 71 of 1971,
L.N. 183 of 1972, 68 of 1972, 78 of 1972, 14 of 1973, 20 of 1973, 12 of 1974, 14
of 1974, 55 of 1974, 57 of 1974, 68 of 1974, 74 of 1974, 80 of 1974, L.N. 58 of
1975, 26 of 1975, 49 of 1975, 74 of 1975, 80 of 1975, 92 of 1975, 4 of 1976, L.N.
223 of 1976, 81 of 1976, L.N. 16 of 1977, 4 of 1977, 36 of 1977, L.N. 149 of
1977, L.N. 48 of 1978, 24 of 1978, 51 of 1978, 69 of 1979, 31 of 1981, L.N. 55
of 1983, 6 of 1983, 20 of 1983, 6 of 1984, 46 of 1984, R.Ed. 1984, L.N. 67 of
1985, 12 of 1985, 25 of 1985, 77 of 1985, 27 of 1986, 10 of 1987, 38 of 1987, 48
of 1987, 52 of 1987, 12 of 1988, 55 of 1988, 79 of 1988, 38 of 1989, 41 of 1989,
L.N. 242 of 1989, 7 of 1990, 17 of 1990, 28 of 1990, 32 of 1990, 59 of 1990, 60
of 1990, 54 of 1991, 77 of 1991, 68 of 1992, 75 of 1992, 86 of 1992, 88 of 1992,
1997]
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SEHK Rules Governing the Listing of Securities ("SEHK
Listing Rules") - establish disclosure and governance requirements
in relation to issuers of securities listed on the SEHK.35
The principal laws and rules in the P.R.C. pertinent to capital
raising are:
Company Law of the People's Republic of China ("Compa-
ny Law") - general corporate formation and governance rules,
some of which expressly apply to listed companies and the
issuance of debt or equity securities;36
Regulations of the State Council on Foreign Capital Shares
Listed in China by Companies Limited by Shares,3" and Imple-
menting Rules of the State Council on Foreign Capital Shares
'Listed in China by Companies Limited by Shares38 - require-
ments for B share offerings;
Notice from the State Council Regarding the Further
Strengthening of the Overall Administration of the Securities
Market - policy guidelines regarding the strict implementation of
securities regulations;
39
Interim Regulations on Share Issuing and Trading -
regulations on the listing and offering process and certain
8 of 1993, 10 of 1993, L.N. 187 of 1993, L.N. 188 of 1993, L.N. 231 of 1993,
75 of 1993, 94 of 1993, L.N. 187 of 1994, 30 of 1994, L.N. 371 of 1994, 72 of
1994, L.N. 570 of 1994, 13 of 1995, 49 of 1995, L.N. (C) 52 of 1995 (Chinese
authentic version), 62 of 1995, 68 of 1995, 83 of 1995, L.N. 11 of 1996, L.N.
135 of 1996, L.N. 235 of 1996, L.N. 306 of 1996, 68 of 1996, 76 of 1996, 3 of
1997 [hereinafter CO].
31 Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited, Rules Governing the Listing of
Securities, Third Edition December 1989, as amended by Update Nos. 1 (issued
January 1990) to 31 (issued January 1997) [hereinafter SEHK Listing Rules].
16 ZhonghuaRenmin Gongheguo Gongsi Fa, Dec. 29, 1993, [The Company
Law of the People's Republic of China], FALO FAGUI, supra note 3, 2-6-1-1-2
[hereinafter Company Law], translated in [2 Business Regulation] China Laws,
supra note 16, 13-518.
s Guowuyuan Guanyu Gufen Youxian Gongsi Jingnei Shangshi Waizigu
de Guiding [State Council Regulations Regarding the Domestic Listing of
Foreign Invested Shares of Companies Limited by Shares], Dec. 25, 1995, FALO
FAGUI, supra note 3, 2-6-5-I15 [hereinafter State Council B Share Regulations],
translated in CHINA L. & PRAc., Apr. 1996, at 20-27.
31 Gufen Youxian Gongsi Jingnei Shangshi Waizigu Guiding de Shishi Xize
[Implementing Rules for the Regulations for the Domestic Listing of Foreign
Invested Shares of Companies Limited by Shares], Dec. 25, 1995, FALO FAGUI,
supra note 3, 2-6-5-111o6, translated in CHINA L. & PRAc., Sept. 1996, at 26-35.
" Document 68, supra note 18.
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secondary market activities; 4°
Securities Exchange Administration Measures - provisions
on the establishment and administration of exchanges in China;
41
Interim Measures on the Prevention of Securities Fraud -
prohibits insider trading, market manipulation and general
fraud;
42
Detailed Implementing Rules on the Disclosure of Informa-
tion by Companies Making Public Offerings of Shares (Trial
Implementation), 4 and Standard Form and Content of Informa-
tion for Disclosure by Companies Making Public Issues, Form
No. 1 and Prospectus Contents (Trial Implementation)44 -
disclosure requirements generally, including periodic reporting
requirements and obligations to announce and publish material
events;
Special Provisions of the State Council on Overseas Share
Offers and Listings of Companies Limited by Shares - general
requirements for the issuance of H or N shares; 4
40 Gupiao Faxing yu Jiaoyi Guanli Zanxing Tiaoli [Provisional Regulations
on the Administration of Share Issuance and Trading], Apr. 22, 1993,
[hereinafter Provisional Regulations], FALO FAGUI, supra note 3, 2-6-5-ITel,
translated in [2 Business Regulation] China Laws, supra note 16, 13-574.
41 Securities Exchange Administration Measures, supra note 21, replacing
Zhengjuan Jiaoyisuo Guanli Zanxing Banfa, [Provisional Measures or the
Administration of Securities Exchanges], July 7, 1993, translated in [2 Business
Regulation] China Laws, supra note 16.
4 Jinzhi Zhengjuan Qizha Xingwei Zanxing Banfa [Provisional Measures
for the Prohibition of Securities Fraud], Sept. 2, 1993, FAL70 FAGUI, supra note
3, 2-6-5-1mT-3, translated in [2 Business Regulation] China Laws, supra note 16,
13-558 [hereinafter Measures to Prohibit Fraud].
" Gongkai Faxing Gupiao Gongsi Xinxi Pilu Shishi Xize [Detailed
Implementing Rules for Disclosure of Information by Companies which
Publicly Issue Shares], July 10, 1993, translated in ISI HANDBOOK, supra note
18, NSR-1.
Zhaogu Shuomingshu de Neirong yu Geshi Gongkai Faxing Gupiao
Gongsi Xinxi Pilu de Neirong yu Geshi Zhunze Diyi Hao [Prospectus Form
and Content, Principles for the Content and Form of Disclosure of Informa-
tion by Companies which Publicly Issue Shares No. 1], June 3, 1993 [herein-
after Standards for Disclosure by Companies Issuing Shares], translated in ISI
HANDBOOK, supra note 18, NSR-1.
"s Guowuyuan Guanyu Gufen Youxian Gongsi Jingwai Muji Gufen ji
Shangshi de Tebie Guiding [Special Regulations of the State Council Regarding
Offerings and Listings Outside China by Companies Limited by Shares], Aug.
4, 1994 [hereinafter State Council Special Regulation on Foreign Share
Offerings], FALW FAGUI, supra note 3, 2-6-5-111.4, translated in [2 Business
Regulation] China Laws, supra note 16, 13-552.
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Notice Regarding the Provision of Guidance for Companies
which Issue Shares to the Public - requires underwriters to assist
issuers with initial public offerings and post-offering compliance
matters;6
Shanghai Securities Exchange Trial Implementation Rules
for Trading Market Operations - includes listing application
requirements;
47
Shenzhen Interim Measures for the Supervision and
Administration of Listed Companies - periodic reporting and
other post-offering disclosure requirements;
48
Shenzhen Interim Measures for the Administration of the
Issue and Trading of Shares - regulations on the listing and
offering process and certain secondary market activities;49 and
Operating Rules of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange -
includes listing application requirements.5 0
The SFC has recently proposed a consolidation and clarifica-
tion of eight of the statutes it currently administers."1 No major
changes are contemplated, and simplification is the main goal.
The SFC's objective is to have this recodification enacted before
46 Guangyu dui Faxing Gupiao Gongsi Jinxing Fudao de Tongzhi [Notice
Regarding Providing Guidance for Companies which Issue Shares], Sept. 11,
1995, translated in ISI HANDBOOK, supra note 18, NSR-1.
47 Shanghai Zhengjuan Jiaoyisuo Jiaoyi Shichang Yewu Shixing Guiding
[Shanghai Securities Exchange Trial Regulations on Market Trading Opera-
tions], Nov. 26, 1990 [hereinafter Shanghai Regulations], translated in ISI
HANDBOOK, supra note 18, SHSER-1.
41 Shenzhenshi Shangshi Gongsi Jianguan Zanxing Banfa [Shenzhen
Municipality Provisional Measures for the Supervision and Administration of
Listed Companies], Apr. 4, 1992 [hereinafter Shenzhen Provisional Measures for
Listed Companies], translated in ISI HANDBOOK, supra note 18, SZC-1.
'9 Shenzhenshi Gupiao Faxing yu Jiaoyi Guanli Zanxing Banfa [Shenzhen
Municipality Provisional Measures on the Administration of the Issuance and
Trading of Shares], May 15, 1991 [hereinafter Shenzhen Provisional Measures
on Issuance and Trading of Shares], translated in ISI HANDBOOK, supra note 18,
SZSR-1.
50 Shenzhen Zhengjuan Jiaoyisuo Yewu Guizhi [Shenzhen Securities
Exchange Operating Rules], June 22, 1991 [hereinafter Shenzhen Operating
Rules], translated in ISI HANDBOOK, supra note 18, SZSER-1.
51 SEcuRITIEs AND FUTURES COMMISSION, A DRAFT FOR A COMPOSITE
SEcuRITIEs AND FUTURES BILL (1996) [hereinafter SFC DRAFT COMPOSITE
BILL]; SECURITIES AND FUTURES COMMISSION, A CONSULTATION PAPER ON
A DRAFT FOR A COMPOSITE SECURITIES AND FUTURES BILL (1996) [hereinafter
SFC CONSULTATION PAPER]; SECURITIES AND FUTURES COMMISSION, MAIN
PROPOSED REVISIONS TO A DRAFT FOR A COMPOSITE SECURITIES AND
FUTURES BILL (1996) [hereinafter SFC REVISIONS TO DRAFT COMPOSITE BILL].
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the hand-over - it is unclear whether that will be achieved. In
the P.R.C., a national securities law has been drafted and under
review and revision for several years. The P.R.C. market
would benefit from the clarifications and improvements such a
law might provide. However, the law's progress may be impaired
by political struggles over the allocation of authority with respect
to securities and other financial markets, or concern that the
P.R.C.'s market experiment might have gone too far. The P.R.C.
seems to be continuing an incremental approach to improving
financial market regulation, rather than a major reform, and the
future of the draft securities law is uncertain.
4. CONTROL OF ACCESS To CAPITAL MARKETS
The most evident difference between Hong Kong and P.R.C.
capital markets lies in the degree of regulatory control over access
to the capital raising process, in particular for the raising of new
equity for enterprises. Hong Kong has essentially no formal
controls, though certain listing and disclosure rules may have
some impact on access. In the P.R.C., there is an elaborate
process for a company to obtain government approval to raise
capital by issuing securities.
An offering of stock listed on the SEHK is the primary means
of equity capital raising in Hong Kong. Not only does the SEHK
have a statutory monopoly on stock exchange activity, but Hong
Kong law prohibits a dealer from trading a listed stock on an
exchange other than the SEHK, and also prohibits such trading,
whether or not on an exchange, for other than immediate
delivery; these provisions have tended to impair development
in Hong Kong (though not offshore) of trading in Hong Kong
stocks other than on the SEHK.
The SEHK's Listing Rules set forth preconditions of a new
listing, including requirements that the company have had
profitable operations in the past three years under essentially the
same management, and that it maintain a sufficient management
presence in Hong Kong, normally at least two of its executive
directors.-' In addition, both the issuer and its business must, in
"2 See China Regulations: Securities Law Now in 14th Draft, EIU ViewsWire,
Apr. 11, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
5 See SO, supra note 6, SS 22, 76(1)(b).
See SEHK Listing Rules, supra note 35, § 8.05, 8.12.
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the SEHK's opinion, be suitable for listing - for example, not
subject to conflicts with business conducted by a controlling
shareholder."5 Based on its authority to determine suitability for
listing, the SEHK has the ability to restrict access to capital
through the listing process.
Prospectuses for offerings in Hong Kong must be approved
under the CO by the Registrar of Companies based on review of
compliance with disclosure requirements; while review of a
prospectus once rested with the Registrar, that responsibility
moved to the SFC, and then to the SEHK for listed issuers.56
The review process, while not directly addressed to the merits of
the offering, can be exacting, and exchange personnel may take an
active role in defining and developing disclosures including
disclosures not specified by the rules. The SEHK's role in
interpreting and applying disclosure standards also therefore can
have an indirect but potentially significant effect on an issuer's
access to the market.
Once a company is listed, it may issue additional stock
without stringent prospectus disclosure or detailed regulatory
review, as in a placing to institutional investors.5 7 Further, for
immediate access to large amounts of equity capital, issuers can
arrange for a major shareholder to sell a block, and then replenish
the shareholder's ownership through a new issue of shares to that
shareholder.5' This two-step approach - sometimes referred to
as a placing and top-up - effectively assures that the company
obtains current market pricing for the entire block. In addition,
rights offerings, where a company grants existing shareholders the
right to buy additional shares, may be accomplished under SEHK
Listing Rules with minimal burden (provided the company is
already listed). SEHK Listing Rules do require shareholder
approval for issuance of shares, except in situations where
55 See id. § 8.04, 8.10.
56 See CO, supra note 34, S 38D, 342C; SFCO, supra note 10, S 47;
Securities and Futures Commission (Transfer of Functions) Order, Feb. 1, L.N.
15 of 1993.
See SEHK Listing Rules, supra note 35, % 7.09-12 & app. 6 (Placing
Guidelines for Equity Securities); CO, supra note 34, § 38(3), 48A, 343(2).
" These transactions generally follow principles for placing stock of a class
previously listed, and the rules on transactions with connected persons apply,
requiring board approval and disclosure. See SEHK Listing Rules, supra note 35,
ch. 14 (Equity Securities - Notifiable Transactions).
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shareholders have already granted a general mandate to directors
of the company to authorize issuance of new shares not exceeding
in the aggregate twenty percent of the company's issued capital.5 9
Access to equity capital in the P.R.C. is intimately related to
the introduction of market economics and the reform of the state
sector, a gradual process which is proceeding with some difficulty.
To date, the most challenging part of this process is the first step
of creating a company limited by shares out of assets and
economic activities previously part of the command economy. If
securities are to be issued following a successful reorganization, the
opportunity for a public issue is itself allocated by government,
and the terms of the securities and the markets in which they are
offered or listed are also controlled. The process is complex and
involves local, regional, and national political issues in addition to
business and economic factors.
The reorganization of state activities into corporate structures
in the P.R.C. is guided by SCRES, which has power to approve
the establishment of companies limited by shares, particularly in
the context of preparing for a public offering of securities.' A
number of other state agencies must pass on various aspects of the
reorganization process. Significant among these is the governmen-
tal agency with regulatory authority over the industrial sector in
which the enterprise operates. Such agencies often play a
substantial role in determining which enterprises are reorganized
and their policies for those enterprises and the industry as a whole
may directly affect the success of a potential offering. Agencies
with broader responsibilities are also directly involved in reorga-
nizing enterprises. The SAAB is responsible for ensuring that
state assets are valued fairly in the reorganization process; this is
accomplished by appraisal, conducted by a firm licensed by the
SAAB.61  Valuation of land and buildings for this purpose
" See id. app. 7 (Listing Agreement), pt. A, 19(b)(2), pt. B, 19(b)(2); CO,
supra note 34, § 57B.
60 Prior to the enactment of the Company Law, SCRES was one of the
primary regulators involved in the creation of companies limited by shares, and
it continues to play a role today. See Document 68, supra note 18; Company
Law, supra note 36.
61 See Congshi Zhengjuan Yewu Zichan Pinggu Jigou Zige Queren de
Guiding [Provision on Confirmation of Qualifications of Assets Valuation
Organizations Engaging in Securities Business], Mar. 20, 1993, translated in ISI
HANDBOOK, supra note 18, NSR-1.
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implicates an additional body, the State Owned Land Administra-
tion Bureau ("SLAB"), and each local branch of the SLAB where
any relevant real property interests are located.6 Regional or
municipal government agencies for areas where the stated-owned
assets or activities are located also may have roles in the pro-
cess.' Once valued and approved for reorganization, the newly
constituted company must register with the SAIC, and formal
existence of the company commences with the issuance by the
SAIC of a business license.64
The creation of a company limited by shares in the P.R.C.
may result in several different types of ownership. The P.R.C.
government normally retains for itself a substantial (usually
majority) ownership of the company through securities referred
to as "State shares," which do not trade. In addition, state owned
enterprises or companies under government control may hold
shares, known as "legal person" shares; these shares may be
transferred to a limited degree in the P.R.C. outside exchanges.
Shares listed on the SHSE and SZSE and owned or traded by
P.R.C. persons are generally referred to as "A" shares. Certain
Chinese companies have also issued so-called "B" shares, which are
- like A shares - denominated in P.R.C. currency - called
renminbi or yuan - but settle in U.S. or Hong Kong dollars in
trading on the SHSE and on the SZSE, respectively. Certain
P.R.C. companies have been allowed to issue shares which are
publicly traded outside the P.R.C. These shares are essentially of
the same sort as B shares, and are usually traded in Hong Kong
dollars and listed on the SEHK ("H" shares) or sometimes in the
form of American Depository Receipts on the New York Stock
Exchange ("N" shares). Similar offerings may also be allowed in
the future on other non-P.R.C. exchanges. For example, an
understanding has been reached on listings of P.R.C. enterprises
62 See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Chengzhen Guoyou Tudi
Shiyongquan Churang He Zhuanrang Zanxing Tiaolie [Provisional Regulations
of the People's Republic of China Regarding the Grant and Assignment of the
Right to Use State Land in Urban Areas], May 24, 1990, FALO FAGUi, supra
note 3, 2-2-0-mI.3, translated in [2 Business Regilation] China Laws, supra note
16, 14-716.
63 For example, labor and pension matters are as a practical matter
regulated locally, as is environmental compliance.
" See Regulations on the Registration of Enterprise Legal Persons, supra
note 29.
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on the London Stock Exchange. 5 A shares are available only to
P.R.C. persons, and B, H and N shares may be sold only to non-
P.R.C. persons."
Once an enterprise has been reorganized, the principal control
over whether it may issue stock under current regulations is
exercised by the SCSC and the CSRC, although various other
agencies are consulted. 7 Further, as in Hong Kong, the exchang-
es on which stocks are listed, SHSE and SZSE, have rules
requiring, as a precondition to listing, that issuers meet certain
standards of financial size and profitability.68 Under national
rules, a company in the P.R.C. seeking a listing for its public
offering must meet a minimum share capital test, have three years
of profitable operations, and not have committed a violation of
law or had false financial statements in the past three years.69
5. DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS
The availability of information is important for investors to
evaluate the relative merits of investments in different companies.
Some investors may not use company-specific information in such
a way - a general judgment that a country, market or industry
sector is growing or shrinking may be a sufficient basis for
purchase or sale of affected securities. But many investors do
make company-specific judgments, requiring assessment of the
relative values of different securities. These judgments are the
means through which capital is allocated among companies based
on their return/risk characteristics and the supply of and demand
for capital. In addition, disclosure requirements may provide a
6s See THE CHINA SECURITIES REGULATORY COMMISSION - HER
MAJESTY'S TREASURY AND THE SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS BOARD,
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON MUTUAL ASSISTANCE AND THE
EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION CONCERNING REGULATORY COOPERATION IN
SECURITIES AND FUTURES MATTERS (1996).
' See State Council B Shares Regulations, supra note 37, art. 4; State
Council Special Regulation on Foreign Share Offerings, supra note 45., art. 2.
6? See Document 68, supra note 18; Company Law, supra note 36; State
Council B Share Regulations, supra note 37, art. 7; Provisional Regulations,
supria note 40, arts. 5, 12; State Council Special Regulation on Foreign Share
Offerings, supra note 45, art. 2.
" See Shanghai Regulations, supra note 47, art. 33; Shenzhen Provisional
Measures on Issuance and Trading of Shares, supra note 49, arts. 15, 37.
69 See Provisional Regulations, supra note 40, arts 8-9, 30; Company Law,
supra note 36, art. 152
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degree of protection against fraud and misrepresentation simply by
demanding greater discipline and effort by companies and their
advisors in making information available.
Both Hong Kong and the P.R.C. authorities have adopted
requirements that a company seeking to obtain a listing for its
stock, or to offer shares to the public, must publicly disclose
information about the businesses, properties, material contracts,
financial condition and results, management, controlling persons
and other matters, either in the form of listing documents or
prospectus or offering memoranda; and for offerings of securities,
the rules generally require disclosures of additional matters
including the use of proceeds of such an offering.70 Listed
companies in both Hong Kong and the P.R.C. have obligations to
report material events when they occur, and financial results at
least every six months; material events include such matters as
significant losses, contracts, litigation, or acquisitions.7 ' These
requirements are based largely on similar requirements in
established markets, especially the United States (for the P.R.C.)
and the United Kingdom (for Hong Kong). As adopted in both
Hong Kong and the P.R.C., these rules are thorough and
demanding.
Hong Kong and the P.R.C. thus accept the proposition that
companies, for securities offerings and for secondary market
trading, should disclose information sufficient to allow investors
to make reasoned decisions about investments. The principal issue
is one of implementation. Hong Kong has higher standards and
enforces better adherence to the rules than the P.R.C.
The most important disclosures are financial. Financial
statements are the universal language and common denominator
for evaluation of investments, an area where, as yet, the P.R.C.,
does not conform to international standards. Examples of
70 See CO, supra note 34, S 38, 342 & Third Schedule (Matters to be
Specified in Prospectus and Reports to be Set Out Therein); SEHK Listin
Rules, supra note 35, app. 1 (Contents of Listing Documents); Provisional
Regulations, supra note 40, art. 15; Standards for Disclosure by Companies
Issuing Shares, supra note 44.
" See SEHK Listing Rules, supra note 35, app. 7 (listing agreement), pt. A,
2-11, pt. B, 2-11; Provisional Regulations, supra note 40, arts. 57-60; De-
tailed Implementing Rules for Disclosure of Information by Companies which
Publicly Issue Shares, supra note 43; see also Shanghai Regulations, supra note
47, arts. 4041; Shenzhen Provisional Measures for Listed Companies, supra note
48, ch. 3.
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weaknesses in the P.R.C.'s accounting rules include carrying of
assets at cost when write-down to market value would be the
international norm, and fixing reserves against bad debts at
arbitrarily low levels, when higher reserving or write-off would be
required if the real likelihood of repayment were considered.72
These examples may tend to overstate the results of P.R.C.
enterprises; other accounting differences, such as use of official
rather than market rates for currency translation, may simply
result in non-comparability, and difficulties for international
participants in making reasoned investment judgments.
There are indications that the P.R.C. is taking disclosure
matters more seriously, at least with respect to fraud. A 1995
decision of the NPC Standing Committee set standards for crimes
mentioned in the Company Law, including preparation of a false
prospectus, share subscription application, or corporate bond
offer.73  To improve the standards for disclosure by listed
companies, the CSRC recently issued new rules which enable it
or its designated representatives to conduct periodic examinations
of listed companies.74 In addition the SHSE has established
requirements that company secretaries for listed companies be
designated as disclosure officers and assume direct personal
responsibility for disclosure by their companies.75
In one aspect of disclosure, Hong Kong and the P.R.C. are
perhaps more progressive than developed markets. Both SEHK
and P.R.C. regulations contemplate the inclusion of profit
n See Peter Wang & Tang Qing Liang, The Current Status ofAccounting in
the People's Republic of China, in ISI HANDBOOK, supra note 18; K. M. Wong,
The History of Accounting Development in the P.R.C., in ISI HANDBOOK, supra
note 18; Wilfred Wong & Paul Yeung, Recent Accounting and Auditing
Developments in the People's Republic of China, in ISI HANDBOOK, supra note
18.
'" See Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwei Huiyuan Hui Guanyu
Chengzhi Weifan Gongsi Fa de Fanzui de Jueding [Decision of Standing
Committee of the National People's Congress on Punishment of Crimes
Violating the Company Law], 8th Cong., Standing Committee 12th Sess.
(1995).
'" See Shangshi Gongsi Jiancha Zhidu Shishi Banfa [Implementing Measures
for the Examination System of Listed Companies], Jan. 20, 1997, ZHONGGUO
ZHENGJUAN BAO [CHINA SECURITIES], Jan. 20, 1997.
's See Foo Choy Peng, New Rules Put Company Secretaries on Information
Frontline at A-Share Firms, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 14, 1996, at B3.
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forecasts in official disclosure documents' 6 Because of fears of
liability for forecasts which do not come true, and concerns that
forecasts would have to be updated, companies in the United
States and other international markets tend not to disclose
forecasts in official disclosure documents. However, in both
Hong Kong and the PR.C., disclosures of projections are
common. This is a sound recognition that forecasts are critical to
valuation; a danger for investors would arise only if the forecasts
were not prepared with sufficient analysis and review.'
Many Hong Kong companies have experience with the
information demands of international investors or lending banks,
and are willing and able to respond with adequate reporting.
P.R.C. companies listing H shares on the SEHK are also required
to meet these standards. Similarly, Hong Kong companies have
developed consistent accounting policies and effective audit
practices, providing some assurance of the integrity of the
disclosures which are disseminated. These factors are as yet
present to a lower degree in the P.R.C., generating more concerns
about the quality of the data informing capital commitment
decisions.
6. OFFERING PRACTICES
Offerings of equity securities are conducted differently in the
Hong Kong and P.R.C. markets. In Hong Kong, the SEHK
Listing Rules allow several alternatives for listing and commence-
ment of trading, but an underwritten subscription offering is
usual.'8 A company usually arranges for a new stock issue
through a group of brokers/dealers acting as underwriters, at least
76 See SEHK Listing Rules, supra note 35, app. 1 (Contents of Listing
Documents), part A (Equity Securities - Not Yet Listed), para. 34 - (1)(b)2),
part B (Equity Securities - Already Listed), para. 29(1)(b)(2), part C (Debt
Securities), para. 41(2)-(3); Standards for Disclosure by Companies Issuing
Shares, supra note 44, S 19.
77 In the United States, the Congres by amendment in 1996 to the
Securities Act of 1933, and previously the Securities and Exchange Commission
by rule, have sought to encourage use of forecasts in disclosure documents by
providing protection against liability. See Securities Act of 1933, as amended,
§ 27A, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2 (1996); Rule 175 under the Securities Act of 1933, 17
C.F.R. § 230.175 (1996).
7 See SEHK Listing Rules, supra note 35, ch. 7 (Equity Securities, Methods
of Listing).
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one of which acts as "sponsor" for the issue." The allocation of
shares to interested investors is administered by the underwriters.
Offerings of B shares to non-P.R.C. investors are likewise accom-
plished through groups of underwriters. 0 Share offerings of A
shares have generally been conducted through a subscription and
lottery process," although rules have recently been adopted with
respect to underwriters of A shares,82 and underwriting may
become more common.
In August 1992, there was excess demand for subscriptions to
A shares being offered in Shenzhen. While citizens throughout
the P.R.C. were eligible, subscriptions were physically available
only for a short period at locations only in Shenzhen. Crowds
gathered there, many were disappointed, and riots ensued. This
incident was widely reported,83 and contributed to adoption of
new national securities regulations in late 1992 and 1993.
Regulations in the P.R.C., as in Hong Kong, require that,
when an offering of shares is made and shares are listed, a
minimum amount must be distributed to the public. In the
P.R.C., the minimum is twenty-five percent of the shares being
offered, subject to grant of exception down to ten percent for
larger companies.84 For H shares on the SEHK, at all times all
must be held by the public; H shares held by the public must be
at least ten percent of issued capital; and the sum of H shares and
other shares held by the public (if any) must be at least twenty-
five percent of issued capital.8" For other listings in Hong Kong,
twenty-five percent of the issued capital must be held by the
public, subject to grant of exceptions down to ten percent for
larger companies if such a lower percentage is not considered to
" See id. S 3.01, app. 9 (Model Code for Sponsors).
80 See China Law-B-Share Rules, CHINA ECON. REV., Jan. 9, 1996, at 32.
a See Provisional Regulations, supra note 40, arts. 20-28.
8, See China: Law-B-Share Rules, supra note 80, at 32.
8 See China's Stockmarkets, Open Outcry, ECONOMIST, Aug. 15, 1992, at
50; Inquiry on Shenzhen Chaos, Vice-Premier Steps in Over Share Sales, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Aug. 12, 1992, at 12; Stock Trading Susended in South China
After Riots, Reuters N. Am. Wire, Aug. 11, 1992, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Wires File.
84 See Provisional Regulations, supra note 40, art. 8(5); see also Shanghai
Regulations, supra note 47, art. 33(3); Shenzhen Provisional Measures on
Issuance and Trading of Shares, supra note 49, art. 37(5).
" See SEHK Listing Rules, supra note 35, S 19A.14(2).
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compromise liquidity.86 A broad distribution is required at
listing, at least 100 investors (more for larger companies) in Hong
Kong,87 1,000 in the P.R.C.8  These requirements are designed
to 'assure a minimum level of liquidity and trading interest for
investors.
Hong Kong has an additional requirement for offerings made
in both Hong Kong and other markets listed in the SEHK - an
adequate number of shareholders from Hong Kong.89 This goal
has been achieved partly by restricting the number of shares in an
offering allocated to prospective purchasers outside Hong Kong,
while allowing reallocation of shares from Hong Kong to non-
Hong Kong investors if the offering is not fully subscribed. This
approach may add to liquidity in Hong Kong trading, and may
give Hong Kong purchasers and securities firms larger shares of
the offering than supply and demand would suggest. However, to
the extent non-Hong Kong investors account for much of the
trading in Hong Kong, requiring allocation to Hong Kong
investors might tend to decrease liquidity, and disadvantage
international investors to the detriment of Hong Kong as an
international marketplace.
In underwritten offerings, underwriters may seek to stabilize
the market price. Although in some circumstances such activity
could be viewed as manipulation, major markets have rules
expressly allowing stabilization in connection with a distribu-
tion.' Both Hong Kong and the P.R.C. have general prohibi-
86 See id. § 808(1).
87 See id. S 8.08(2).
" See Provisional Regulations, supra note 40, art. 30(3). To the extent prior
exchange standards are different, they are presumably superseded by the more
recent national rule. See Shanghai Regulations, supra note 47, art. 33(4);
Shenzhen Provisional Measures on Issuance and Trading of Shares, supra note
49, arts. 15(7), 37(5).
89 SeeJoint Policy Statement on Offering Mechanisms, The Stock Exchange
of Hong Kong Limited - Securities and Futures Commission, Nov. 4, 1994
[hereinaf-ter Joint Policy Statement]; Global Offering Mechanism, Securities and
Futures Commission - The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited, July 1,
1996.
o See Regulation M under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R.
SS 242.100 - .105 (effective Mar. 4, 1997) (replacing Rues 10b-6, 10b-7 and 10b-
8); SECURrTIES & FUTuRES AUTHORITY, SFA RULEBOOK 5 547, app. 16
(Stabilization Rules); SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS BOARD, SIB RULEBOOK,
FINANCIAL SERVICES (CONDUCT OF BUSINESS) RULES 1990 pt. 10 (Stabilization
Rules) (1990).
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tions against manipulation,91 and the Hong Kong law expressly
prohibits stabilization as defined by SFC rule;92 but neither
Hong Kong nor P.R.C. law provides specific exemptive relief for
stabilization. SFC's proposed recodification of Hong Kong
securities laws would add prohibitions expressly including
stabilization of stock markets in and outside Hong Kong, and give
the SFC the ability to create exemptions.93 Yet, the SFC and
SEHK have already approved a practice which has a potentially
stabilizing effect. Underwriters frequently sell more shares
than are available in an offering, thus going "short" in a process
called over-allotment; the underwriters then "buy-in" the short
position in the market, with such purchases providing demand for
and supporting the stock in the period immediately after an
offering. The proposed law change could - absent concurrent
adoption by the SFC of satisfactory exemption - create uncertain-
ty and be inconsistent with Hong Kong's permissive posture on
over-allotments, and could make it less attractive to list interna-
tional stock offerings in Hong Kong.
Thus, Hong Kong stock offering practices are generally similar
to practices in other developed markets, though in certain respects
the Hong Kong rules may contain restrictions that could impede
international offerings listed in Hong Kong. In the P. R.C., stock
offerings rely on high retail demand for scarce supply, allowing
direct distribution to investors. As the P.R.C. markets grow, and
investors become more discriminating, additional techniques will
likely develop to take advantage of the distribution by intermedi-
aries, particularly for sales to institutions.
7. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE - PROTECTION OF
S2HAEHOLDER INTERESTS
Many companies in Hong Kong have controlling or majority
shareholders, or are parts of groups of companies under common
control or influence. In the P.R.C., the State retains a substantial
if not majority ownership, directly or through state owned
91 See SO, supra note 6, § 35; Measures to Prohibit Fraud, supra note 42.
92 See SO, supra note 6, § 146.
9 See SFC DRAFT COMPOSITE BILL, supra note 51, S 12.6(1)(c), (2)(c),
12.16; SFC CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 51, 122; SFC REVISIONS TO
DRAFT COMPOsITE BILL, supra note 51, 97.
94 See Joint Policy Statement, supra note 89.
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enterprises, in nearly all companies, and some P.R.C. companies
may also have other large, influential shareholders. Such patterns
of ownership and control are common in developing economies
where wealth remains concentrated in the government or a few
private holders, and may continue to exist in developed econo-
mies.
Hong Kong law recognizes the primacy of the interests of
shareholders generally, rather than those of controlling persons.
The law in the P.R.C. also purports to recognize shareholder
interests generally. Nevertheless, the legitimacy of such interests
is not consistently acknowledged in a system that regards private
ownership and market processes as experimental.
Protection of shareholder interests enhances the company's
ability to raise capital. A stock investor's objective is to partici-
pate in the profitability of the company in proportion to that
investor's interest in the company's capital, without being
disadvantaged by special benefits to controlling persons or other
parties. If providers of capital have less than full confidence that
their interests will be served by the company, they will tend to
pay less for the stock of the company, and the company will tend
not to be able to raise as much capital. Regulations are designed
to protect investors mainly through requiring disclosure and
specific corporate procedures in conflict of interest situations.
For example, in Hong Kong, the SDIO applies to persons who
individually or with others (in relationships defined by the law)
hold ten percent or more of a company, as well as the directors
and chief executive of the company (including shares owned by
their family members). Under the SDIO, these persons must
make public disclosure of their securities interests in the company
and provide updates of disclosed information when there are
changes. The enforcement provisions of this law are strong. A
company can demand information of an investor, as can the Hong
Kong government. If the information is not forthcoming, legal
remedies are available, notably, freezing the shares." In addition,
if holdings in excess of thirty-five percent of a company are
accumulated in the market, an offer to shareholders generally
must be made and the Hong Kong rules relating to takeovers
come into play.96
s See SDIO, supra note 32, % 41, 44-47.
96 See discussion infra Section 8.
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The SEHK Listing Rules require that there be at least two
non-executive, independent directors not affiliated with controlling
shareholders. The SEHK has issued qualifications for directors,
and as a condition of listing, each director must meet those
guidelines to the satisfaction of the SEHK; the SEHK also requires
directors to conduct themselves consistently with its Code of Best
Practice; and a director is obligated to comply with the SEHK's
Model Code For Securities Transaction by Directors of Listed
Companies, which covers a director's reporting responsibilities
under the SDIO and also specifies an obligation not to deal on
insider information.
In addition, the SEHK has detailed disclosure and shareholder
approval provisions regarding certain transactions of listed
companies with connected persons and their associates. These
rules require substantial disclosures designed to address concerns
regarding transactions which might not be in the interests of
shareholders generally. Similar requirements also apply to major
asset transactions, corporate acquisitions, and share transactions,
whether or not involving connected persons. Where shareholder
approvals are called for, these rules generally require that a
connected person with an interest abstain from voting.9
P.R.C. regulations contain some analogous requirements.
When a legal person's direct or indirect holding of outstanding
ordinary shares of a listed company equals five percent of the total
outstanding ordinary shares, the holder is required to notify the
company, the exchange, and the CSRC, and the holder must also
make a public announcement; additional increases or decreases of
two percent must also be notified and published.99 In addition,
if the holding reaches thirty percent, a tender offer must be
made.10
There are no regulatory requirements in the P.R.C. for non-
executive directors. The general duties of directors are set out in
the Company Law."1 Listed companies in the P.R.C. must, in
97 See SEHK Listing Rules, supra note 35, at 3.08-3.15, 8.15, app. 10 (Model
Code For Securities Transactions by Directors of Listed Companies), app. 14
(Code of Best Practice).
98 See id. ch. 14 (Equity Securities - Notifiable Transactions).
9 See Provisional Regulations, supra note 40, art. 47.
100 See discussion infra Section 8.
101 See Company Law, supra note 36.
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addition to a board, have a supervisory committee which is
comprised of shareholders and employee representatives and
performs an oversight function intended to check the powers of
the directors. 02  Certain major actions require shareholder
approval under provisions of P.R.C. rules.' 3 In addition, there
are requirements on the SZSE similar to those in Hong Kong
relating to disclosure and shareholder approval of substantial
transactions including connected transactions, but the latter are
limited to transactions involving individuals - company person-
nel, their relatives and entities controlled by them - and not
other entities controlling the company.' 4
The limited impact of specific rules for disclosure and
independent shareholder approval of related party transactions in
the P.R.C. is not surprising. With the government essentially in
control of both governmental and corporate assets and activities,
the potential scope of disclosures could be overwhelming. The
issue of related party transactions lies at the core of concerns
about investments in P.R.C. companies. Many of the economic
relationships within the P.R.C. are not of a market nature, but
rather are influenced greatly by the government or entities
somehow controlled by the government. Thus, a company's
affairs may not be administered in the economic interests of the
company or its other shareholders. Availability of supplies for a
company, demand for its products and services, and the pricing
and other terms of its transactions may be controlled by govern-
ment-related rather than market forces. In such a situation, the
government or other controlling entity may cause the company
to act in a manner which is disadvantageous to its non-governmen-
tal shareholders in order to serve political or social objectives.
There is no resolution of this tension between corporate responsi-
bilities to shareholders generally, and the fact that corporations
in the P.R.C. remain, to varying degrees, instruments of the State.
The experience to date with H share companies sheds some
light on how this issue might develop. In creating and bringing
H share companies to the market, it has sometimes been
1o See id. arts. 124-128.
103 See id. art. 103; see also Shenzhen Provisional Measures for Listed
Companies, supra note 48, ch. 6.
104 See Shenzhen Provisional Measure for Listed Companies, supra note 48,
arts. 29, 46.
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necessary to define, perhaps through new regulations or agree-
ments, the nature of relationships among the H share company,
the P.R.C. government, the company's individual and corporate
affiliates, and its suppliers and customers. These relationships can
then be disclosed in the context of the offering. To some degree,
this exercise appears similar to creating and then disclosing the
regulatory structure for a company in a highly regulated business
(such as telecommunications, electric utilities, or banking) in a
primarily market-driven economy. In the P.R.C., such relation-
ships ultimately express the balance of government and private
decision-making in the economy.
At this time, it is not realistic to expect the P.R.C. to subject
corporate/governmental economic relationships to determinations
by votes of private shareholders. Indeed, H share companies have,
in listing on the SEHK, obtained waivers releasing them from
compliance with SEHK transaction disclosure and approval
rules."0 5 Nevertheless, continuing efforts to define and explain
these relationships would improve investor understanding and
facilitate commitment of capital to P.R.C. enterprises.
8. FAIRNESS IN THE TRADING MARKET
The willingness of an investor to provide capital by purchasing
stock of a company depends in part on the discretionary ability
of the investor, at a later time, to liquidate the investment for fair
market value. In Hong Kong, the trading market of the SEHK
has achieved a greater degree of market integrity than has yet been
achieved on the two exchanges in the P.R.C.
One element of market integrity is a safe and secure process
for clearing and settling trades. In Hong Kong, an efficient book
entry system has been developed for SEHK trading, and transac-
tions normally settle on the second day after trade date ("T+2"),
with transfer of shares through a book entry system rather than
physical delivery. °6 An essentially equivalent settlement pattern
10s See, e.g., CHINA EASTERN AIRLINES CORPORATION LIMITED,
PROSPECTUS 104-06 (1997); ANHUI EXPRESSWAY COMPANY LIMITED,
PROSPECTUS 75-77 (1997); NANJING PANDA ELECTRONICS COMPANY LIMITED,
PROSPECTUS 87-89 (1996); QINGLING MOTORS COMPANY LIMITED, PROSPEC-
TUS 48 (1994); MAANSHAN IRON & STEEL COMPANY LIMITED, PROSPECTUS
57-59 (1993).
" See SEHK Listing Rules, supra note 35, S 8.13A; General Rules of
CCASS, Hong Kong Securities Clearing Limited, Update January 1996.
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was achieved early in the development of the two P.R.C.
exchanges for B shares using book entry procedures and T+3
settlement,"7 and A shares settle on a same or next day basis in
reliance on prior deposits of settlement funds. 18
Trading volumes, the first indicator of liquidity, are higher on
the SEHK than in B shares on either of the two exchanges in the
P.R.C., though A shares sometimes trade locally in the P.R.C. in
significant volumes.' °9
The individual retail investor is significant in the Hong Kong
stock market, and dominates the publicly listed A share market in
the P.R.C. Institutions have been important in Hong Kong as
well. In the P.R.C., institutions are not well established because
the government has not encouraged their development and private
savings have not grown sufficiently to support such vehicles as
mutual funds, pension funds, and insurance products. With a
heavy retail influence, both the Hong Kong markets to some
degree, and the P.R.C. markets to a greater degree, have been
viewed as influenced significantly by speculative activity.
A recent incident exemplifies the risks in the P.R.C. markets.
In February 1995, there was aggressive speculation and an attempt
to manipulate the market through short-selling of bond futures in
advance of an issue of government bonds, conducted by one of the
largest P.R.C. securities firms, the Shanghai International Securi-
ties Company ("SISCO"); the effort failed, the market gyrated,
SISCO suffered huge losses and defaulted, certain trades were
invalidated, and trading was curtailed at the request of the
CSRC.1
10
0 See Shanghai Zhengjuan Jiaoyisuo Jiaoyi Shichang Yewu (Renminbi
Tezhong Gupiao) Buchong Guiding [Shanghai Securities Exchange Supplemen-
tal Rules of Trading Market Operations for Special Renminbi Shares], Feb. 18,
1992, ch. 6, translated in ISI HANDBOOK, supra note 18, SZBSR-1; Shenzhen
Zhengjuan Jiaoyisuo B Gu Jiaoyi Qingsuan Yewu Guiding [Shenzhen Stock
Exchange Operating Rules for the Trading and Clearing of B Shares], Jan. 31,
1992, ch. 6, translated in ISI HANDBOOK, supra note 18, SZBSR-1.
108 See Shanghai Regulations, supra note 47, ch. 10; Shenzhen Operating
Rules, supra note 50, ch. 5.
109 See ZHONGGUO ZHENGJUAN BAO [CHINA SEcurus], supra note 74,
Feb. 1, 1997, at 6; B-Shares Find New Lease of Life, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1996, at
33; China Foreign Currency Share Pessimism Prevails, Reuter Eur. Bus. Rep.,
Oct. 25, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Eurnews File.
11 See Trading in Bond Futures Ruled Out, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May
1, 1996, at B1; Revival Plan for Shanghai Futures Firm, Government to Decide
Plan to Rescue Sisco, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 7, 1995, at 1; New Stain
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The laws and rules in both the SEHK and P.R.C. have
provisions addressing the main sorts of market abuses: fraud,
misleading statements about securities, false or fictitious trading,
insider trading, manipulation, and short selling."' These express
the appropriate government desire to maintain market integrity,
and restrain and penalize disruptive or abusive market behavior.
Hong Kong generally is viewed as having a more substantial
securities enforcement program than the P.R.C. However, there
has been enforcement activity in the P.R.C. An early reported
instance, shortly after the stock exchanges were reintroduced,
occurred in 1993, when the CSRC fined the Shenzhen-listed
Baoan Group for violating public disclosure rules during a
takeover bid.112 In another more recent example, the CSRC
published a decision to impose penalties against a tourism
company and a securities trading center for, among other things,
insider trading and other securities law violations. 13
The significance of abuses is more apparent in the P.R.C., as
evidenced both in the SISCO case and others. One commentator,
on reviewing two CSRC penalty proceedings, found it "somewhat
disturbing to discover that there are not yet sufficient regulatory
mechanisms in place on the Shanghai and Shenzhen markets to
prevent the occurrence of market manipulation capable of
increasing share prices by 102% or 157% during the course of one
day. "114
One other element of regulation of the trading market is
worthy of mention in considering the interests of investors
purchasing stocks in Hong Kong or the P.R.C. - takeovers. In
addition to requirements that shareholders disclose accumulations
on Sisco Image in Arrest of Executive, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 22, 1995,
at 1; Futures Frenzy Continues-Market Waits for Stringent Trading Regulations
and Strict Enforcement, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 13, 1995, at 1.
... See SO, supra note 6, § 74, 76, 80, 135-139, 147; CO, supra note 34,
40A, 342F; SIDO, supra note 33, % 22-25; PIO supra note 31, SS 3, 4; SEHK
Listing Rules, supra note 35, § 6.01; Measures to Prohibit Fraud, supra note 42,
ch. VII; Shenzhen Provisional Measures on Issuance and Trading of Shares,
supra note 49, art. 43.
12 See Kent Chen, Baoan Fine is First for Securities Watchdog, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Oct. 23, 1993, at B1.
113 See ZHONGGUO ZHENGJUAN BAO [CHINA SECURITIES], Jan. 18, 1997,
supra note 74.
114 Philip Gregory, Securities Fraud in the PRC, CHINA L. & PRAc., Mar.
31, 1995, at 20, 22.
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of ten percent or more of the stock of a company, Hong Kong
law compels a general offer from any person (including others
acting in concert with such person) accumulating thirty-five
percent or more of the company's stock in the market; this is
regulated under a special code and panel for considering takeover
matters in Hong Kong,11 5 modeled after a similar structure in
the United Kingdom. These arrangements are supposed to ensure
that all shareholders benefit from takeovers in a fair and equitable
way, and that the disclosures process gives sufficient time for
investors to respond and in a manner that would protect their
interests.
In the P.R.C., there are disclosure requirements for persons
acquiring more than a specified amount, plus a rule requiring an
accumulator of thirty percent or more to make a general offer to
all shareholders, and more detailed standards for takeover activities
in SZSE rules.11 6  Takeovers occur with some frequency in
Hong Kong, though most are not hostile and many involve
controlling shareholders. In the P.R.C. there have been only a
few instances of widely-reported takeover attempts.117  Because
of government controls of companies in the P.R.C., hostile
takeover efforts by private actors are essentially hypothetical.
There have been suggestions, however, that takeovers might be
accomplished in the P.R.C. through accumulations and transfers
of legal person shares owned by government enterprises -
perhaps the beginning of a mergers and acquisitions phenomenon
among P.R.C. enterprises.
9. BOND MARKET
Hong Kong's debt securities market has developed more
slowly than its stock market. The banking industry is dominant
115 See Codes on Takeovers and Mergers and Share Repurchases, Securities
and Futures Commission, Mar. 1992, amended Nov. 1992, amended June 1994,
amended Dec. 1994; Takeover and Mergers Panel established under SFCO,
supra note 10, 5 6(1).
116 See Provisional Regulations, supra note 40, arts. 4748; Shenzhen
Provisional Measures for Listed Companies, supra note 48, ch. 6.
117 See generally. Michael Hickman & Benjamin Miller, Mergers and
Acquisitions Yearbook 1997, China, INT'L FIN. L. REV. (forthcoming, Fill 1997);
Foo Choy Peng, Aggressive SAIC Set to Buy Out Strugglers, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Mar. 13, 1997, at BI (reporting plans to transfer state shares in two
unsuccessful companies to a successful company).
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among financial institutions in Hong Kong, and is the primary
source of lending. The Hong Kong government has experienced
favorable balances and has had little need to borrow. Neverthe-
less, in recent years, the Hong Kong government and its authori-
ties have issued bonds and notes, and there is now an active
market in them. Further, Hong Kong institutions manage
substantial funds and are significant potential bond buyers. There
is minimal individual retail investor interest in debt securities in
Hong Kong, but with recent growth of government issuance and
efforts of the SEHK to list debt securities, Hong Kong has begun
to attract a larger volume of debt securities issuance including
SEHK listings of bonds of supra-national organizations such as the
World Bank and the Asian Development Bank."'
The recent development of the bond market in Hong Kong
has been facilitated by relatively limited regulation. While various
laws and rules in theory could be applied, bond offerings to
institutions in Hong Kong are well covered by exemptions and
special provisions.
119
The prospectus disclosure requirements of the CO apply only
to securities issued by companies. Accordingly, the Hong Kong
government and its instrumentalities, as well as other sovereigns,
are not subject to these requirements. The HKMA is active in
issuing bills and notes through a tender process for the Hong
Kong government, and the Hong Kong Mass Transit and Airport
authorities have also issued debt. Further, a company not
incorporated in Hong Kong is exempt if its debt issue is distribut-
ed only to "professionals," that is, "persons whose ordinary
business it is to buy or sell shares or debentures, whether as
principal or agent."" 0 Many Hong Kong businesses are incorpo-
rated outside of Hong Kong, and even those incorporated in
Hong Kong can take advantage of this exemption through use of
a foreign affiliate as issuer (with the Hong Kong company as
guarantor if necessary). There is also an exemption for transac-
... See generally INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND
DEVELOPMENT/WORLD BANK, THE EMERGING ASIAN BOND MARKET,
BACKGROUND PAPER, HONG KONG (1995) [hereinafter HONG KONG BOND
MARKET BACKGROUND PAPER].
119 These exceptions and special provisions are also theoretically available
for equity offerings, but are inconsistent with public distribution and exchange
trading of stocks.
120 See CO, supra note 34, § 343(2).
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tions not constituting public offerings - a "private placement"
exemption - with limitations on offerees (though no numerical
requirement) and a six-month holding period.'
2 1
Rather than rely on the "professionals" or "private placement"
exemptions, issuers may seek from the SFC an order exempting
an issue from prospectus requirements.'2 Such exemptions are
generally granted if the proposed offering document has essentially
what would be required for listing the securities on the SEHK,
whether or not the securities are in fact so listed. In addition, the
requirements for listing bond issues were simplified by the SEHIK
in 1994 as to "selectively marketed securities," a term similar to
but perhaps broader than securities marketed to "profession-
als."' 2' Accordingly, listing is now a practical pathway to bond
issuance in Hong Kong. A company which lists its debt securities
on the SEHK must still obtain from the SFC an exemption from
prospectus requirements of the CO and a separate SFC exemption
from the SDIO's requirements that substantial shareholders,
directors, and chief executives of listed companies disclose their
interests in securities of their companies. 24 In any event, the
SFC normally grants exemption from these requirements to
issuers of "selectively marketed securities."
An additional statutory requirement potentially affecting bond
issuance in Hong Kong is the PIO, which restricts public
invitations to purchase in an issue. If regulated (or exempt)
dealers and advisers are the only ones involved in the distribution,
their invitations to the public are exempt,' 25 but debt offerings
often involve foreign distributors. A second exemption is
available for invitations relating to offerings exclusively outside
Hong Kong or to professionals.16  A third way to satisfy the
PIO is to list with the SEHK, since invitations to purchase are
permitted if in the form of a prospectus approved in the listing
121 See id. S 38(3), 48A.
122 See id. S 38A, 342(A).
'23 See SEHK Listing Rules, supra note 35, ch. 37 (Debt Securities -
Selectively Marketed Securities).
124 See SDIO, supra note 32, S 2A(2). An issuer whose equity securities are
already listed on the SEHIK would be unable to benefit from such an exemption
from the SDIO.
"z See PIO, supra note 31, S 4(2)(fc).
126 See id. S 4(3)(9)(vii).
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process1 '2
Some Hong Kong government issues and other highly rated
Hong Kong dollar issues may benefit from greater liquidity in
Hong Kong because Hong Kong banks can borrow on an
overnight basis through sale/purchase agreements with the
HKMA under its Liquidity Adjustment Facility ("LAF'), using
such bonds as collateral." Hong Kong banks will therefore be
more likely to buy and own bonds denominated in Hong Kong
dollars which can be used in this facility.
There are special legal issues relating to issuance of certificates
of deposit, for which there is a significant market in Hong Kong,
and a largely theoretical concern that bond issuance could be
considered deposit-taking, permitted only for specified institutions
in Hong Kong as determined by the HKMA. However, these
considerations have generally not disturbed the availability of
sufficient exemptions from securities law and regulatory require-
ments.
This regime facilitates the integration of Hong Kong into the
broad international debt capital markets, sometimes referred to as
the Eurobond or (when an Asian issuer and primarily Asian
investors are involved) Dragonbond market. The investors in this
market are largely institutional rather than individual, although a
few high net worth individuals participate.
The market for debt securities in the P.R.C. was reestablished
in 1981 with the issuance in the P.R.C. domestic market of
significant amounts of P.R.C. government debt. Much smaller
volumes of debt have been issued by banks and non-bank financial
institutions and state-owned enterprises within the P.R.C. In the
last several years, the P.R.C. government itself and a few P.R.C.
entities, generally P.R.C. banks and financial institutions, have
issued debt securities in international markets, mainly denominat-
ed in U.S. dollars and Japanese yen. Some P.R.C. financial
12 See id. S 4(2)(c).
I At present, there are three categories of Hong Kong dollar securities
that will be accepted as collateral under the LAF, namely, Exchange Fund
Bills/Notes, Government Bonds (Category A); Hong Kong dollar debt
instruments issued by the Mass Transit Railway Corporation or The
Provisional Air ort Authority, and Hong Kong dollar debt instruments with
an AAA rating by Standard & Poor's or its equivalent (Category B); and other
Hong Kong dollar debt instruments considered acceptable to HKMA with
rating of (i) A or above if issued by a bank, or (ii) A or above if issued by a
non-bank issuer (Category C).
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institutions serve as "windows," borrowing in capital markets, and
then on-lending to P.R.C. domestic borrowers. In general, P.R.C.
banks remain a more significant source of borrowed funds for
P.R.C. enterprises than debt capital markets, viewed in compari-
son to other developed and emerging economies.129
As in the case of equity securities issuance, debt securities
issuance by P.R.C. entities is subject to strict government controls
and approvals. The MOF manages and regulates the issuance of
debt of the P.R.C. government itself, mainly Treasury bills and
bonds sold to retail investors throughout the P.R.C.130 This
constitutes by far the largest segment of the P.R.C. domestic bond
market. Bond issues by financial institutions are regulated by the
PBOC.' Debt securities of state-owned enterprises, the largest
category other than Treasury securities, are issued based on quotas
and regulations of PBOC and SPC.132 The PBOC regulates
bond issues in international markets, along with the SAFE.133
Convertible securities convertible into equity are regulated by
both the CSRC and SAFE.14 Key aspects of regulations include
the allocation of access to issuers based on quotas determined
under the national credit plan,"15 and the fixing of interest rates
for the securities generally based on a spread over similar
governmentally determined bank deposit rates.
129 See generally INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND
DEVELOPMENT/WORLD BANK, THE EMERGING ASIAN BOND MARKET,
BACKGROUND PAPER, CHINA 1995 (1995) [hereinafter CHINA BOND MARKET
BACKGROUND PAPER].
130 See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guokujuan Tiaoli [Regulations on
Treasury Bills of-the People's Republic of China], Mar. 18, 1992, FALO FAGUI,
supra note 3, 4-2-2-111.3.
131 See Guowuyuan Guanyu Jiaqiang Gupiao Zhaijuan Guanli de Tongzhi
[State Council Notice Regarding Strengthening of Administration of Shares and
Bonds], Mar. 28, 1987, FALO FAGUI, supra note 3, 2-6-5-IV*1.
13 See Qiye Zhaijuan Guanli Tiaoli [Regulations on the Administration of
Enterprise Bonds], Aug. 2, 1993, FArO FAGUI, supra note 3, 2-6-5-111.2.
33 See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying discussion.
114 The Com pany Law states that the CSRC must approve the issue by any
listed company oy a security convertible into shares. See Company Law, supra
note 36, art. 172. To the extent that the instrument also involves the creation
of foreign currency debt, approval by and registration with SAFE will also be
required. See Waizhai Tongi Jiance Zanxing Guiding [Interim Regulation on
Statistics and Supervision of Foreign Borrowing], Aug. 27, 1987, FALO FAGUI,
supra note 3, 4-2-1-111-5, translated in [1 Business Reguation] China Laws, supra
note 16, 8-706.
135 See Document 68, supra note 18.
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The most striking feature of the PR.C. debt market has been
the pattern of distribution of government securities. Buyers have
been mainly individuals in the retail market, whereas debt markets
in other countries and international debt markets are almost
exclusively institutional. In the P.R.C., bond issuances have been
regarded as similar to taxation, that is, a way of obtaining funds
to finance the budget deficit. The MOF, banks and local
government agencies have required the purchase of Treasury
securities by individuals (and sometimes institutions) throughout
the P.R.C., without regard to demand and even though the
securities bear interest at relatively low rates; distribution
techniques have included levies on wages of individuals. Problems
arose with this system, notably an illegal trading market in which
securities sold well below par. To correct this situation, the
P.R.C. government shortened maturities, reducing the discount in
the secondary trading market, and used market-driven underwrit-
ing techniques for distribution. But the compulsory or adminis-
tered character of distribution has not been eliminated, and has
resulted in a large portion of the P.R.C. population owning
government bonds. While some Treasury issues have been legally
non-tradeable, most are now tradeable, and there is an active
secondary market conducted throughout the P.R.C., on the SHSE
and SZSE, and in bond trading centers around the country using
electronic systems.136
The P.R.C. Company Law imposes requirements on bond
issues by joint stock companies, 137 although issuance by such
companies has been minor. Such issues are required to be
submitted to and approved by an appropriate instrumentality,
State Council, SCSC, or CSRC, an information memorandum
with specified information is required, provisions must be made
to facilitate transfer of the bonds, and the issuer must meet certain
standards of financial size and health, must use proceeds for
specified purposes and not to cover losses, and must pay interest
on the bonds only up to a maximum set by the State Council
(which also has the power to impose other conditions).38
136 See generally CHINA BOND MARKET BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note
129.
137 See Company Law, supra note 36, ch. V.
138 See id. art. 164.
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10. CURRENT HONG KONG/P.R.C. RELATIONSHIP-RED
CHIPS AND H SHARES
The Hong Kong capital markets already play a significant role
in generating investment funds for the P.R.C. In recent years,
many companies listed on the SEHK have developed business
interests in the P.R.C. These interests may be primarily in
trading in and out of the P.R.C., but also may involve ownership
of assets and production facilities inside the P.R.C. To the extent
these companies raise capital in the equity market in Hong Kong,
and invest the resulting proceeds in the P.R.C., Hong Kong is
already performing the role of capital provider to the P.R.C.
Also, some of the companies listed on the SEHIK in Hong Kong
have enterprises government authorities or from the P.R.C. as
significant or controlling shareholders.1 9 When these Hong
Kong listed companies raise capital, the recipient will be a
corporate group controlled or influenced and partly owned from
the P.R.C. Proceeds of stock or bond offerings may or may not
be invested in the P.R.C., but they will be available to meet
P.R.C. economic objectives to the extent expressed through the
group and particular company. The most successful of these
P.R.C.-related companies are often called "red chips."
One technique for creating these cross-border owner-
ship/investment structures has been a so-called "back-door" listing
on the SEHK of a P.R.C. enterprise or business. As in other
markets, some SEH listed companies suffer business declines
and become either inactive, or much less active, so that the price
of acquiring a significant position in such company is quite
modest. P.R.C. interests have sometimes acquired controlling
positions in such Hong Kong listed companies, and then revital-
ized them by selling or transferring to the SEHK-listed company
businesses conducted by the P.R.C. enterprise, usually located in
the P.R.C. The proceeds of any such sale would flow to the
previous P.R.C. business, and would represent new capital for that
firm under P.R.C. control. The purchase by the Hong Kong
139 For example, China Resources Enterprises Limited, CITIC Pacific
Limited, and Cosco Pacific Limited, all SEHK-listed companies, are controlled
through indirect ownership by the P.R.C. Ministry of Foreign Trade and
Economic Cooperation ("MOFTEC"), and China International Trust &
Investment Corporation and the P.R.C. Ministry of Communication,
respectively.
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entity, and its the ownership and operation of the businesses could
be funded by the SEHK-listed issuer with capital raised in the
Hong Kong market. The net effect of these transactions is that
the Hong Kong market has provided capital to the P.R.C., and
the P.R.C. owner - while giving up some ownership of the assets
- may still control them through holding shares in the SEHK-
listed company. In 1993, the SFC and SEHK released a statement
discouraging back-door listing, focused on fairness to non-
controlling shareholders, and this practice has faded.
41
Transfers to Hong Kong companies also may raise issues under
P.R.C. law, which may require approvals for P.R.C. entities to
own investments, assets or businesses outside the P.R.C. While
such approval requirements have not been consistently observed
by enterprises or enforced, the issue apparently had to be
addressed in H share transactions where in forming the compa-
nies, it was necessary to exclude assets or businesses outside the
P.R.C. which may have been acquired without all of the arguably
required P.R.C. government approvals - inclusion of these assets
in the H share company might have prevented counsel from
providing clean legal opinions. To the extent that a back-door
listing might transfer state-owned assets, the P.R.C. government
might now exercise control through the mechanism of prior
approval requirements.
A second approach was the creation of off-shore companies to
hold enterprises or businesses in the P.R.C. Although P.R.C.
interests remained in control, these holding companies then listed
and offered shares internationally. This type of listing first
occurred in Hong Kong in 1992, and was repeated in offerings on
the New York Stock Exchange, the first in 1992 for Brilliance
China Automotive. 41  However, the P.R.C. soon concluded
that international capital raising should be conducted by P.R.C.
rather than foreign entities.142
Efforts to raise capital through sales of equity in P.R.C.
enterprises outside the P.R.C. became most evident with the 1993
memorandum of understanding on the subject entered into by
14 See SFC and SEHK Increase Scrutiny of Back.Door Listings/Takeover
Executive Warns Against Special Benefits, SFC BULL., May - June 1993, at 4.
141 See generally BRILLANCE CHINA AUTOMOTIVE HOLDINGS LIMITED,
PROSPECTUS (1992).
142 See Document 68, supra note 18; State Council Special Regulation on
Foreign Share Offerings, supra note 45.
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the CSRC and the SFC. 43 Pursuant to that understanding, the
SEHK amended its rules to permit listing of enterprises from the
P.R.C., with various modifications to accommodate the particular
circumstances of P.R.C. companies, and also to impose upon them
a higher disclosure standard and a greater responsibility to
investors than what would have been imposed under P.R.C.
principles. 44 As previously noted, waivers have been granted
from certain related-party requirements for H share offerings.1 45
An additional accommodation was a relaxation of SEHK Listing
Rules to allow elimination of the three year profitability require-
ment for companies engaged in infrastructure projects including
ones in the P.R.C.
46
From the point of view of innovative regulation, the H share
effort has been quite successful - the regulatory understanding
was reached and the transactions went forward. There have,
however, been some difficulties in subsequent implementation.
Questions have been raised, for example, about whether P.R.C.
enterprises that raise funds in H share offerings in fact have used
the proceeds of those offerings in the manner that was originally
indicated in the prospectus. There have also been questions raised
about the accuracy of the information provided by those compa-
nies to the market, particularly once several H share companies
suffered significant earnings declines, prompting concerns about
the accuracy of prior financial reports and projections.
In these structures, P.R.C. persons would not own all of the
equity of the SEHIK-listed company - public shareholders would
retain an interest. Particularly when there are transactions
between controlling shareholders and Hong Kong listed compa-
nies, these situations have attracted the attention of Hong Kong
regulators. They have been concerned that such transactions be
fair to the company and the other shareholders, and such
143 See The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong & Shenzhen Stock Exchange,
Memorandum of Regulatory Cooperation Between China Securities Regulatory
Commission, the Securities and Futures Commission, the Shanghai Securities
Exchange, the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong, and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange,
SFC BULL., May-June 1993, at 15-19.
'" See SEHK Listing Rules, supra note 35, ch. 19A (Equity Securities -
Issuers Incorporated in the People's Republic of China).
14 See discussion supra Section 7.
146 See id. § 8.05(2). See generally STOCK EXCHANGE OF HONG KONG
LIMrTED, GUIDANCE ON THE REQUIREMENTS IN RELATION TO THE LIsTiNG
OF INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT COMPANIES (1996).
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situations contributed to the development of the rather detailed
provisions of the SEHK Listing Rules relating to disclosure and
shareholder approval of major transactions of a company,
especially transactions with connected persons. Nevertheless, the
reorganizing of P.R.C. and non-P.R.C. interests in SEHK-listed
companies continues to occur under the SEHK rules today, with
disclosures and approvals in accordance with those rules.
H share offerings have been approved only for large, often
complex businesses being incorporated and partially privatized by
the P.R.C. It has been difficult to create the companies to hold
the previously governmental operations, and to prepare informa-
tion sufficient to meet disclosure standards for an international
offering. Smaller B share companies have attracted some foreign
investor interest, but they trade only on the P.R.C. markets, the
SHSE and SZSE. These smaller companies may increasingly seek
to raise capital outside the P.R.C., but the SEHK's standards are
probably too stringent for them.
11. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE IS CHINA
The Hong Kong and P.R.C. capital markets today differ in
important respects. Hong Kong's markets grew under market
principles over an extended period, experienced a crisis in the 1987
market break, underwent significant regulatory reform, and now
resemble other developed markets around the world. The
P.R.C.'s capital markets were created by government decisions in
the last decade, and while already substantial, are still undergoing
major changes and continue to be viewed by the P.R.C. as
experimental. Both P.R.C. and Hong Kong markets and their
regulation have been modeled on examples from developed
countries, but the results have varied. In the P.R.C., application
of market principles in a still government-controlled economy is
producing anomalies.
Capital raising in Hong Kong developed from needs of
growing businesses and commitment of private savings. In the
P.R.C., there was administered distribution to the general
population by the government of its debt securities, essentially a
form of taxation, and sale of shares in government enterprises to
raise capital and respond to public interest in trading securities.
Companies can access capital markets in Hong Kong with little
regulatory restraint, while access to capital markets for P.R.C.
companies is controlled by the government based on both political
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and economic factors.
Disclosures by companies in Hong Kong are in the range of
those in other developed markets. In the P.R.C., however,
information available about issuers, particularly financial informa-
tion, is still less than satisfactory by international standards.
Investors must tolerate varying degrees of uncertainty about
continued government involvement in a company, including what
could be regarded as troublesome related-party transactions.
Continuing government control of enterprise activity suggests that
the P.R.C., while seeking the benefits of raising funds in the
market, is not entirely comfortable with allowing the market to
make capital allocation decisions. Better disclosure, which might
improve the efficiency of a market allocation mechanism, may
have ambiguous policy implications for the P.R.C and may
therefore be slow to develop.
Trading in government bonds and equities has captured the
imagination of P.R.C. citizens, and has been dominated by
individual retail investors. Systems for trading have been
established, and there has been significant interest and participa-
tion. The individual retail investors in the P.R.C. tend to have a
speculative approach. Hong Kong, with an institutional as well
as retail investor base, may be a less speculative market. Both
P.R.C. and Hong Kong markets have appropriate rules constrain-
ing market abuses. While the markets in the P.R.C. and their
regulators have made enormous progress in a short time, compli-
ance and implementation in the P.R.C. is less advanced than in
Hong Kong, and the impact of abuses appears greater in P.R.C.
markets.
The P.R.C.'s markets remain largely closed to foreign
participation, resulting in limited international interest in domestic
P.R.C. securities. The B share market has made only a small
contribution to generating international involvement in equities,
and it may be some time before a broad base of international
investors is ready to commit large amounts of capital to the
P.R.C. domestic equity markets.
The Hong Kong markets, on the other hand, are open - both
international and domestic investors participate actively and have
provided significant capital to the P.R.C. both through '"red chip"
companies with interests in the P.R.C., and more recently,
through H share offerings. Red chip, H share, and smaller SEHK-
listed issuers with interests in the P.R.C., because they have met
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the higher Hong Kong standards, should be effective in raising
capital internationally for the P.R.C. for years to come.
It seems less likely that Hong Kong will become a source of
equity capital raising for companies not already having significant
ties to Hong Kong or the P.R.C. The international element of
Hong Kong's bond market has grown recently, particularly with
Hong Kong dollar issues of supra-national borrowers being listed
on the SEHK. The P.R.C. and Hong Kong have substantial
foreign exchange reserves, and Hong Kong has strong banking and
financial companies and money management institutions. There
is perhaps more likelihood of internationalization in the Hong
Kong bond market than in its stock market, but again, new
P.R.C. issuers are likely to be the most significant addition.
With Hong Kong's increasing reliance and interdependence
with the P.R.C., one must ask whether regulation in Hong Kong
will change. By definition, if more issuers in Hong Kong are
from the P.R.C., and if the P.R.C. controls access by these
companies to capital markets, more of the companies in the Hong
Kong market will have been subjected to that process. Political
influence on Hong Kong regulators, combined with their power
to interpret and apply listing and disclosures standards and other
rules, could lead to greater regulatory control of access to markets
in Hong Kong. In addition, the accommodations by Hong Kong
regulators on related-party disclosures and infrastructure offerings
could signal a willingness in Hong Kong to compromise. There
is thus some risk that the hand-over may increase governmental,
non-market controls on and dilute regulatory standards for capital
raising activities in Hong Kong. Nevertheless, Hong Kong
markets are likely to retain a substantial advantage over P.R.C.
markets for international capital raising from a regulatory and
disclosure point of view.
The P.R.C. government may be ambivalent about market
processes and may restrain their development in China generally.
Yet that very restraint may contribute to the P.R.C. continuing
the market experiment in a contained venue in Hong Kong. The
SFC has stated a key objective of making Hong Kong the
preferred center for debt and equity capital raising activities for
the P.R.C.147 The hand-over promises to enhance Hong Kong's
opportunity to serve as China's channel of access to international
1'7 See SFC, CORPORAT PLAN 1996/97 - 1998/99 (1996).
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